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1. Introduction 
The use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) was legitimised and expanded as a market access 
instrument in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). The motivation was to 
guarantee minimum levels of market access and to safeguard current levels of access in the face 
of the high MFN tariffs resulting from tariffication. 1371 TRQs have been notified by 37 
countries to the WTO as a result of the Uruguay Round (G/AG/NG/5/7).
1 Already, in the 
scheduling of TRQ commitments, it was alleged that various ruses were used to limit quota 
volumes (a process which has been called ‘dirty quotification’, Bureau and Tangermann, 1999).  
For example, a group of developing countries complained that the domestic consumption 
calculations were manipulated in setting minimum access levels (G/AG/NG/W/37).  They also 
point out that the practice of establishing TRQs based on highly aggregated commodity groups, 
rather than on a product-by-product basis, was contrary to the specifications in the Modalities 
where it was agreed that minimum access opportunities were to be established on a relatively 
disaggregated product level.  Various problems have also been identified in the implementation 
of TRQs (de Gorter and Sheldon, 2000; Skully, 2001). A majority of TRQs are not being filled 
and thus minimum access commitments are not being met (G/AG/NG/5/7). While there may 
be market explanations for this lack of demand, there is widespread agreement that quota 
underfill is in part attributable to the administrative methods employed to implement TRQs. 
TRQs also generate rents, and the allocation procedures to distribute those rents distort trade 
and can be subject to political influence (Abbott and Morse, 1999; Abbott, 2001).  
In the agricultural negotiations currently under way in the Special Session on Agriculture 
in the WTO, a number of countries have made proposals to improve the administration and size 
of TRQs. Exporting countries are calling for increases in tariff rate quotas to improve market 
access opportunities. The US, for example, has proposed that these should be substantially 
increased by annual increments over a fixed period and their functioning improved, including 
dealing with unfilled quotas. For this purpose, it proposes to base the reduction of in-quota 
duties on the historical performance of TRQ fill rates: the lower the fill rate the deeper the duty 
cut. An automatic trigger mechanism is suggested to reduce in-quota duties in response to falling 
fill rates (G/AG/NG/W/58). The Cairns Group has also called for substantial increases in all 
tariff quota volumes (G/AG/NG/W/54).  Canada has proposed that, where tariff peaks remain 
after a further round of MFN tariff reductions, new TRQs could be opened in order to 
guarantee a minimum of market access (G/AG/NG/W/12). The EU’s negotiating proposal is 
                                                 
1   WTO documents are referenced by the WTO document code in this paper and are available to download from 
the WTO website www.wto.org.   4 
noticeably silent on the issue of increasing TRQs. However, it does propose that rules and 
disciplines should be defined to increase the transparency, the reliability and the security of the 
management of TRQs such that the concessions already granted are fully realised 
(G/AG/NG/W/90).   
Developing countries have also called for a substantial expansion of TRQs and for the 
simplification of their administration.  One developing country group wants arrangements to 
ensure that new suppliers from developing countries have equal access to allotments within 
TRQs and has called for the mandatory filling of quotas, in developed countries, before imports 
take place at the above-quota level (G/AG/NG/W/37).  India has called for the stricter 
application of the MFN principle in allocation of TRQs but with special preference being given 
to developing countries having less than $1,000 per capita income (G/AG/NG/W/102).  
Nigeria also calls for tariff quotas to be made global, and that where bilateral quotas continue, 
global quotas should be in addition to these countries’ quotas and allocated to countries that are 
not covered by bilateral country quotas (G/AG/NG/W/130).  The Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) propose that certain percentage increases in minimum access TRQs should be 
allocated at a zero in-quota tariff to SIDS.  They also propose that specific duty-free TRQs 
outside minimum access quotas should be provided to SIDS (G/AG/NG/W/97).  Mauritius, as 
a significant TRQ beneficiary, is concerned to maintain the value of trade preferences and wishes 
to maintain a meaningful difference between in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs 
(G/AG/NG/W/96).   
There are two important policy ideas contained in these proposals.  First, with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm all participants appear to accept that TRQs will continue to be part of the 
next agricultural agreement, and most are seeking an expansion in their volume.  This is despite 
the recognition in India’s proposal that TRQs have perpetuated trade distortions by legitimising 
quantitative restrictions, generating quota rents and denying market access to newcomers.  The 
other idea is that TRQs might be administered preferentially to favour market access by 
developing countries or a subset of them.  Preferential treatment of developing countries under 
TRQs could take a number of forms. First, in-quota tariffs might be levied at a lower rate or 
eliminated for developing country exporters. Second, a proportion of increased tariff rate quotas 
might be reserved for developing country exporters or a sub-set of them. Third, licensing 
arrangements could be required to ensure the transfer of quota rents to developing country 
exporters.  
Any or all of these options would appear to lead to net gains to developing country 
exporters.  However, a full discussion must recognise that gains in multilateral trade negotiations   5 
require the expenditure of negotiating effort and capital.  Pursuing one negotiating objective 
comes at the cost of neglecting others.  In particular, efforts to obtain more favourable TRQ 
access could distract developing countries from seeking MFN tariff reductions.  It is thus 
important to weigh up and evaluate the costs and benefits of alternative approaches.   
Have developing countries benefited from existing TRQ access?  Which countries would 
be likely to benefit from expanded TRQ access, and for which commodities?  How would 
preferential TRQs fit into other schemes of preferential access for developing country exports?  
Are the gains from pursuing expanded TRQ access likely to be significant?  This paper makes a 
limited attempt to answer these questions using the EU market as a case study.  Section 2 
examines the use developing countries make of the EU’s TRQs in agricultural trade.  Section 3 
examines the legal issues raised by the proposal for preferential TRQ administration.  Section 4 
discusses whether developing countries should spend their trade-negotiating capital on 
improving market access through increasing TRQs as compared to seeking further reductions in 
MFN tariffs.  Section 5 summarises the conclusions of the paper. 
 
2.  Developing country use of EU TRQs  
We wish first to determine whether developing countries benefit from TRQ access.  To 
keep the data task manageable, we focus on the EU market for agricultural and food imports. In 
1997, this amounted to 51.7 billion ECU (Table 1).
2 The most important commodity group is 
processed foods and drinks which accounted for about 16 billion ECU, followed by fruits, 
vegetables and nuts (about 11 billion ECU), tropical products covering coffee, tea and cocoa 
(about 8.7 billion ECU) and oils and oilseeds (about 8.1 billion ECU). Almost 60 per cent of 
these imports are supplied by developing countries. Latin American countries have a 28.0 per 
cent share of the total, non-least developed ACP countries account for 12.3 per cent,  and non-
least developed Asian countries account for a further 12.2 per cent. Least developed countries 
(LDCs) account for only 3 per cent of the EU’s agricultural imports. 
These imports enter the EU on both MFN terms and also under a complex network of 
preferential access agreements on both a reciprocal and non-reciprocal basis (WTO, 2000). More 
than 20 countries in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America have now signed free trade 
agreements with the EU. These include the Central and Eastern European countries in the 
context of Europe Agreements, and neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean basin under 
                                                 
2   This value is the sum of HS Chapters 1 to 24 less fish and fish products (Chapter 03). The Agreement on 
Agriculture in addition covers a small number of additional products in HS Chapters 25 and above which are not 
included in Table 1 (See Annex 1, AoA).   6 
the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Agreements. The EU has also entered free trade arrangements 
with South Africa and Mexico, and negotiations are under way with Chile and MERCOSUR. 
Apart from reciprocal free trade arrangements, it has initiated two non-reciprocal trade 
arrangements:  the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) and the Lomé Convention (now 
Cotonou Agreement) trade preferences with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. 
Most recently, it has announced the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative directed to all least 
developed countries.  
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0.3 0.2  9.9  13.4  0.1  1.6  0.3  20.5  46.4  0.1 
Least developed ACP 
countries 
8.6  4.9  154.8 813.7  3.3 142.6  72.3  373.  6  1  573.9  3.1 
Other ACP 
developing countries 
133.0  1.4  1 563.2  2 268.4  36.6  284.2  531.8  1 715.9  6 534.5  12.7 
Other Asian 
developing countries 
174. 7  62.9  1064.6  1 223.3  234.8  1 542.1  178.9  1 739.4  6 220.4  12.0 
Other Latin American 
developing countries 
941.5  69.5  2 968.1  4 002.8  246.4  1 937.2  127.7  5 065.1  15 358.3  29.7 
Other North African 
and Middle Eastern 
developing countries 
158.1  9.6  1 406.1  48.7  4.9  358.2  32.0  492.4  2 509.9  4.9 
Total developing 
countries 
1 416.1  148.6  7 166.7  8 370.2  526.2  4 265.9  943.1  9 406.9  32 243.7  62.4 
Total developed or 
transition countries 
2 709.9  817.5  3 798.5  294.1  1 130.5  3 879.5  219.7  6 570.1  19 419.9  37.9 
Total EU  agriculture 
imports 
4 126.1   966.1  10 965.3  8 664.3  1 656.6  8 145.4  1 162.8  15 977.0  51 663.6  100.0 
Share of developing 
countries, % 
34.3  15.4  65.4 96.6 31.8 52.4 81.1  58.9 62.4  … 
Source : Eurostat Comext external trade database; country groupings according to 
Eurostat classification 
 
The EU established 85 TRQs in its Schedule resulting from the Uruguay Round. An 
extra quota for grape juice and grape musts was added in September 1996 following negotiations 
in the context of EU Northern  enlargement. A quota for rum and taffia was added in July 1997 
resulting from an agreement between the EC and the USA on spirituous beverages.  This rum 
quota has not been taken into account in the following analysis which is based on 1997 data. The 
EU distinguished in its notifications to the WTO between current access and minimum access   7 
quotas. Current access quotas were designed to safeguard historical quantities imported under 
special arrangements while minimum access quotas were opened to fulfil the minimum access 
obligations of the AoA.  44 of the EU TRQs are current access quotas, 36 are minimum access 
quotas, while the remaining 6 are non tariffied product quotas (these quotas were opened for 
products which did not have to undergo tariffication to convert non-tariff barriers to tariffs to 
comply with the AoA).  
Tariffs under the EU’s current access quotas are much lower than the respective out-of-
quota tariff. Bureau and Tangermann (1999) estimate that, on average, for the 50 quotas under 
current access and for non-tariffied products, the in-quota tariffs show a reduction of 80 per cent 
compared to the out-of-quota tariff at the beginning of the implementation period. Since the in-
quota tariffs remain unchanged over the implementation period while the out-of-quota tariffs are 
reduced by an average of 36 per cent, these authors estimate that in-quota tariffs for current 
access quotas will be about one-third of the corresponding out-of-quota rate by 2001.  
For TRQs under minimum access, the EU applied a relatively uniform reduction. Most 
in-quota tariffs have been set at 32 per cent of the out-of-quota MFN initial (base) tariff. 
Exceptions include milled rice, durum and quality wheat which are subject to a zero in-quota 
tariff and for high quality meat where there is a much lower in-quota tariff set compared to the 
very high MFN tariff. Also, these in-quota tariffs are not scheduled to change over the 
implementation period, so they will be closer to 40 per cent of the out-of quota tariff by the end 
of the implementation period (Bureau and Tangermann, 1999). 
The EU used current access quotas to maintain previously-existing preferential access 
arrangements. Of the 44 current access TRQs, 14 are allocated to a particular list of countries. 
Several of these quotas list developing countries as beneficiaries (including China which was not 
a WTO member when the EU Schedule was submitted). Some of these quotas are allocated to 
ACP countries as a result of the Lomé Convention (now the Cotonou Agreement). This includes 
four quotas for sheep, goats and mushrooms as well as the 1.2 million tonne quota of sugar.  
Others are allocated to Central and Eastern European countries. The EU Schedules mention 
that, for 18 out of the 36 minimum access quotas, the EU may count against these quotas 
preferential imports from Central and Eastern European countries under the Europe 
Agreements. This is the case for pigmeat (5 quotas), poultry (3 quotas), dairy products (7 quotas) 
and processed eggs (3 quotas). However, neither the quantities admitted under quota nor the 
eligible countries are specified in the Schedule itself.  
EU TRQs are usually defined at the HS8 digit level of the Harmonised System tariff 
classification. The 86 TRQs considered in this paper cover 335 individual HS8 tariff lines. To   8 
provide a clearer idea of the products covered by TRQs, Table 2 sets out the 86 TRQs grouped 
according to the HS4 digit categories of the commodities which they cover. Most TRQs include 
tariff lines from within the same HS4 category, although there may be more than one TRQ 
opened within a HS4 category. There are 43 HS4 categories in which TRQs have been opened 
for individual tariff lines, or around 22 per cent of the eligible total. Not all products specified at 
the 8-digit level within a HS4 category are necessarily covered by a TRQ, so the proportion of 
eligible HS8 lines covered by a TRQ is lower than this percentage. 
Table 2 distinguishes between whether access is provided under current access, minimum 
access or non-tariffied product quotas. Four products stand out with respect to the importance 
of their TRQs in terms of the volume of imports covered. In each case, the TRQs concerned are 
mainly current access quotas. The products are:  manioc, arrowroot and sweet potatoes (where 
three TRQs were introduced to guarantee access to Thailand and Indonesia for manioc imports 
previously exported under a VER, as well as arrowroot and sweet potatoes from China);  maize 
(where the current access quota of 2m tonnes represented compensation to the United States for 
accession of Spain to the EU);  bananas (where the TRQs arose from the EU’s attempts to 
regulate market access following the introduction of the common market organisation for 
bananas in 1993); and sugar (where the TRQ represents the commitments to import sugar under 
the Lomé Convention from ACP countries and India). Other products where sizeable TRQs 
have been opened include meats, some dairy products and eggs, fruits and vegetables and cereals. 
The final column of Table 2 shows actual imports in each HS4 category compared to the 
TRQs opened in that category. Actual imports are calculated only for those HS8 tariff lines in 
the category for which TRQs have been opened and thus do not represent total imports in that 
category. Where the percentages are less than 100, there is a strong presumption that all imports 
enter under the TRQs and that the TRQs have created or, in the case of current access quotas, 
maintained trade flows which would not otherwise occur because of high over-quota tariffs. This 
would appear to be largely the case for meat (except poultry), dairy products, cereals (except rice) 
and cane sugar. In the case of HS4 categories where the percentages are substantially greater than 
100 and there are significant trade flows outside of the TRQs, then the main function of the 
TRQ will be to create rents, which may or may not accrue to the exporter, rather than to create 
additional trade. This would seem to be the case for fruit juices, apples, citrus fruits, potatoes and 
other vegetables, for example. 
   9 
Table 2. EU TRQs grouped by HS4 digit codes 
HS4 
code 

















as % of 
total 
TRQ 
0102  Live bovine animals (head)  179,000     179,000  … … 
0104  Live sheep and goats  40,110      40,110  27,223  68 
0201  Meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled  38,550    20,300  58,850  79,788  136 
0202  Meat of bovine animals, frozen  142,600    9,300  151,900  106,553  70 
0203  Meat of swine, fresh, chilled or frozen      24,100  24,100  39,799  165 
0204  Meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or 
frozen 
284,625     284,625 218,100  77 
0206  Edible meat offals   144,100    20,300  164,400  1,826  1 
0207  Meat and edible offal of poultry      20,536  20,536  137,199  668 
0402  Milk and cream, concentrated or containing 
added sugar or other sweetening matter 
    45,921 45,921 72,402  158 
0405  Butter, incl. dehydrated butter, and other 
fats and oils derived from milk, dairy 
spreads 
76,667    2,000 78,667 85,256  108 
0406  Cheese and curd  18,750    28,898  47,648  75199  183158 
0407  Bird's eggs, in shell, fresh, preserved or 
cooked 
   83,241  83,241  7,510  9 
0408  Bird's eggs, not in shell, and egg yolks      6,284  6,284  1,751  28 
0701  Potatoes, fresh or chilled    4,000    4,000  251,372  6284 
0706  Carrots and other root vegetables, fresh or 
chilled 
 1,200   1,200 8,145  679 
0707  Cucumbers and gherkins, fresh or chilled  1,100      1,100  2,934  267 
0709  Other vegetables, fresh or chilled     500    500  46,095  9219 
0711  Vegetables provisionally preserved  62,660      62,660  9,298  15 
0712  Dried  vegetables   12,000   12,000 28,256  235 
0714  Manioc, arrowroot, sweet potatoes and 
other high starch roots and tubers  
7,457,590     7,457,590 2,712,056  36 
0802  Other nuts, fresh and dried    90,000    90,000  103,800  115 
0803  Bananas, incl. plantains, fresh or dried  2,200,000      2,200,000  3,245,184  148 
0805  Citrus fruits, fresh or dried  45,000      45,000  451,685  1004 
0806  Grapes, fresh or dried  1,500      1,500  32,545  2170 
0808  Apples, pears and quinces, fresh  1,600      1,600  307,149  19197 
0809  Apricots, cherries, peaches incl. nectarines, 
plums and sloes, fresh 
3,800     3,800  20,824  548 
1001  Wheat and meslin      350,000  350,000  3,073,308  878 
1004 Oats      21,000  21,000  2,480  12 
1005  Maize and corn  2,000,000    500,000  2,500,000  2,662,174  106   10 
1006 Rice  1,000    83,000  84,000 698,454  831 
1007 Grain  sorghum  300,000     300,000 160,523  54 
1008  Buckwheat, millet, and other cereals   1,950      1,950  88,013  4513 
1104  Cereal grains otherwise worked      10,000  10,000  1,881  19 
1108 Starches,  inulin  3,950      3,950  109  3 
1601  Sausages and similar products      600  600  6,805  1134 
1602  Prepared and preserved meat, offal or 
blood  
    1,220 1,220 2,251  185 
1701  Cane or beet sugar and chemically pure 
sucrose, in solid form 
1,432,895     1,432,895 1,354,533  95 
1702 Other  sugars  4,504      4,504  23,876  530 
2003  Mushrooms and truffles  62,660      62,660  39,362  63 
2009 Fruit  juices    1,500  14,000  15,500 796,231  5137 
2302  Bran, sharps and other residues  475,000      475,000  22,821  5 
2309  Preparations of a kind used in animal 
feeding 
122,800     122,800 247,288  201 
3502  Egg  albumin      9,280 9,280 1,880  20 
Sources:  Eurostat Comext external trade database;  AMAD;   WTO (G/AG/N/EEC/1) ; WTO 
(G/AG/NG/S/7); own calculations 
 
Table 3 provides similar information on the importance of TRQs, but this time in value 
terms. For presentational purposes the HS4 categories have been aggregated into 8 commodity 
groups. The objective is to see how important TRQ trade is with respect to total flows of 
agricultural imports to the EU. Three indicators are used. The first is the actual value of imports 
in the HS8 tariff lines covered by TRQs and their importance relative to total imports (shown in 
Column 2). The drawback of this measure is that, as shown in Table 2, for some of these tariff 
lines considerable trade takes place outside of the TRQ. Thus the values in Column 2 are 
generally greater than the value of actual TRQ imports reported in Column 6, with the exception 
of sugar and sugar confectionery (this exception is discussed below). A second indicator tries to 
put a potential value on TRQ quota trade. This is done by calculating the unit value of the HS8 
trade flows for which TRQs are opened and multiplying the eligible or maximum TRQ quantities 
by these unit values (Column 4). The assumption made is that the imports which enter under 
TRQs are broadly representative, in terms of source and quality, of all imports entering under a 
HS8 tariff line. The third indicator is similar to the second one, except that notified imports 
under each TRQ are used instead of the eligible TRQ volumes to measure the actual value of 
trade (Column 6). Notified imports are the volume of imports notified by the EU to the WTO 
and, for some TRQs, correspond to the volume specified in the licenses given to importers, not 
to the actual quantities imported (G/AG/N/EEC/13). It has been argued that this leads to an   11 
over-estimation of actual TRQ imports as licenses may not be turned into imports. The EU 
holds that this is not the case as importers must provide a deposit when applying for a licence 
and would be unlikely not to make use of this import permission (Bureau and Tangermann, 
1999). In 1997, it appears that the value of notified imports in the sugar and sugar confectionery 
sector did exceed the value of actual imports in that year. Apart from the licence utilisation issue, 











































  (1)  (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)=(4)/(1) (6) (7)=(6)/(1)  (8)=(6)/(4) 
  MECU  mECU % mECU % mECU %  % 
Live animals and 
meats1 
4,126 2,148  49.652.1 2,655  64.3 1,872  45.4 70.5 
Dairy  966 506  70.252.4 578  59.9 476  49.3 82.4 
Fruit, vegetables 
and nuts 
10,965 3,413  31.1 2,512  22.9 2,063  18.8 82.1 
Tropical 
products 
8,664 0  0.0 0  0.0 0  0.0 …
Cereals and 
milling products 
1,657 1,388  81.183.8  508  30.6  291  17.6 57.3 
Oils and oilseeds  8,145  0  0.0  0  0.0  0  0.0 …
Sugar and sugar 
confectionery 
1,163 720  61.9 744  64.0 744  64.0 100.0 
Other processed 
foods and drink 
15,977 859  5.4 151  0.9  66  0.4 43.7 
Total    51,664 9,034  17.5 7,148  13.8 5,512  10.7 77.1 
1 Three TRQs for live bovine animals are excluded because the TRQs are expressed in heads but imports 
are defined in tonnes. 
Sources:  As for Table 2. 
 
                                                 
3  It is not a problem of the valuation of these imports as the discrepancy is also evident in volume terms.   12 
The total value of TRQ imports in 1997 was ECU 5.5 billion or just under 11 per cent of 
EU agricultural and food imports.  Expressing TRQs in value terms emphasises the greater 
importance of the TRQs for live animals and meats. These potentially cover a greater value of 
trade than the TRQs for fruits and vegetables (which include the manioc, arrowroot, sweet 
potato and banana TRQs mentioned above) although actual imports are still greater under the 
TRQs opened for fruits and vegetables. This conclusion would be reinforced if account were 
taken of the ACP banana quota which is not notified as a TRQ. TRQs in these two commodity 
groups accounted for 69 per cent of all TRQ imports in 1997. No TRQs have been opened for 
tropical products or oils and oilseeds where substantial imports take place in any case. On the 
other hand, half or more of actual imports in the case of sugar, dairy products and live animals 
and meat entered under TRQs. Potentially, TRQ imports could amount to 14 per cent of actual 
imports though, in practice, just under 11 per cent of EU agricultural imports entered under 
TRQs. The difference between actual and potential TRQ imports can be defined as the fill rate.
4  
The average fill rate expressed in value terms is 76 per cent. Sugar, dairy and fruit and vegetable 
TRQs have the highest fill rates, while fill rates for cereals and milling products, live animals and 
meat and other processed foods and drink are below average.
5   
In the context of this paper, we are interested in the extent to which developing 
countries have been able to make use of the EU’s TRQs. Table 4 shows how the ECU 5.5 billion 
of TRQ imports in the six commodity groups where TRQ imports actually took place in 1997 
were distributed across exporter groupings.
6  In absolute terms, TRQs are most important for 
developing countries in the fruit and vegetable, meat and sugar sectors. Developing countries 
make little use of TRQs in the dairy, cereal or processed food sectors. Overall, developing 
countries take up 60 per cent of TRQ imports and developed countries 40 per cent.  These 
shares are very similar to the shares of these groups in total EU imports. 
                                                 
4  Normally, fill rates are calculated for individual TRQs using data on import volumes and commodity 
aggregations are based on unweighted averages. The fill rates presented in Table 2 are similar except that 
individual TRQ fill rates are aggregated to the commodity group totals using the relative unit import value of 
each TRQ as weights.  
5   The fill rate for cereals and milling products may be underestimated as the available TRQ is reduced by 
imports of maize gluten feed, brewers’ grains and citrus pulp and this has not been taken into account in these 
figures. 
6   Many TRQs cover a number of HS8 tariff lines and it is not possible to state which tariff lines will be used to 
exploit the TRQ. The assumption is made that imports under TRQs take place in proportion to the total imports 
of all the HS8 tariff lines covered by each TRQ. Imports under current access TRQs are allocated to the named 
supplier countries in those TRQs, while for minimum access and non-tariffied product TRQs, it is assumed that 
each country grouping benefits from the TRQ according to its shares of the individual HS8 tariff lines covered 
by that TRQ.  The method, although the best available given the data, is crude and is not reliable where small 
values of trade are concerned.   13 















Total EU  1 872  476   2 063  291  744   66  5 512 
Least developed non-ACP 
countries 
0  0 0 0  0  0 -     
Least developed ACP 
countries 
4  6 0 1  58  0  69   
Other ACP developing 
countries 
140 1 15  6  526  0  688   
Other Asian developing 
countries 
21 10 336  22 17  1  407   
Other Latin American 
developing countries 
696  2  1 227   77  120   2  2 124  
Other North African and 
Middle Eastern developing 
countries 
1 6 24  1 2  0  34   
Total developing countries  862  24  1 602   107  723   4  3 322  
Total developed or transition 
countries 
1 010  452   460  185  21  62  2 190  
Source:  Own calculations based on the sources cited for Table 2 















Total EU  45.4   49.3   18.8   17.6   64.0   0.4   10.7 
Least developed non-ACP 
countries 
-  -    -    -    -    -    - 
Least developed ACP 
countries 
46.5   122.41   -    30.3   80.2   -    4.4  
Other ACP developing 
countries 
105.31   71.4   1.0   16.4   98.9   -    10.5  
Other Asian developing 
countries 
12.0   15.9   31.6   9.4   9.5   0.1   6.5  
Other Latin American 
developing countries 
73.9   2.9   41.3   31.3   94.0   0.0   13.8  
Other North African and 
Middle Eastern developing 
countries 
0.6   62.5   1.7   20.4   6.3   -    1.4  
Total developing countries  60.9   16.2   22.4   20.3   76.7   0.0   10.3  
Total developed or transition 
countries 
37.3   55.3   12.1   16.4   9.6   0.9   11.3  
1 These figures exceed 100 per cent because of errors introduced by the assumptions needed to allocate actual trade 
to TRQs when absolute trade volumes are very low, see footnote 5. 
Source:  Own calculations based on the sources cited for Table 2   14 
This similarity of shares is coincidental, given that TRQs are opened on a commodity-
specific basis and the profile of agricultural exports from developing countries is different from 
developed countries. TRQ exports as a proportion of total exports of the different country and 
commodity groupings are shown in Table 5. This gives an indication of the dependence of 
developing countries on TRQs for market access in each commodity grouping, and the scope 
either for increasing market access or quota rents to developing countries if TRQs were 
increased.  The figures are interpreted as showing, for example, that of all imports of live animals 
and meat from developing countries in 1997, 61 per cent entered under TRQ arrangements. 
Overall, around 10 per cent of developing country agricultural exports to the EU entered 
under TRQs.  This was only a slightly smaller proportion than for developed countries in 1997 
although the difference is not a significant one.  These figures are based on actual in-quota 
imports and are thus influenced by differences in fill rates between developing and developed 
country suppliers for bilateral quotas.  There are particularly high shares of TRQs in total trade 
for meat imports from non-LDC ACP countries and for sugar imports from ACP and Latin 
American sugar exporters.  These are current access quotas, opened specifically to benefit the 
developing country recipients.  The remaining developing country exports entered under MFN 
tariffs (which might be zero) or benefited from preferences under GSP, Lomé or preferential 
trade agreements.  With just 10 per cent of their exports covered by TRQs, and with some quota 
levels clearly binding, there is scope to benefit developing countries by a further extension of the 
volumes and commodities covered by TRQs.  Expansion of the sugar and meat TRQs would 
likely lead to increased export volumes, while expansion of TRQs for fruit and vegetables, 
cereals and other processed foods could lead to either increased volume or increased rents, 
depending on whether existing trade is deflected through TRQ channels or not.  Thus, the 
evidence from the EU market suggests that increasing TRQs could be an important means of 
improving market access for developing country exporters.   
 
3.  Would WTO rules allow preferential TRQs?  
One of the reasons why developing country exporters benefit from the EU's TRQs is 
that a number of these were opened specifically as current access quotas to maintain pre-existing 
preferential access commitments.  Some developing countries have suggested that reserving 
quota allocation for developing countries could be further extended in the allocation of increased 
TRQs.  Other ways of providing preferential treatment under TRQs could also be envisaged, 
including offering preferential in-quota tariffs or requiring licensing arrangements to maximise   15 
the rent transfer to developing country exporters.  This section examines the legal issues 
surrounding proposals to introduce a preferential element into TRQ administration. 
TRQs were indirectly introduced by the WTO Agreement on Agriculture through Article 
4 which specifies that “market access concessions contained in Schedules relate to bindings and 
reductions or tariffs, and to other market access commitments as specified therein” (italics added).  These 
other market access commitments were set out in the Agreement on Modalities for the 
Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the Reform Programme (GATT, n.d.). 
These Modalities were never formally adopted and thus are not part of the AoA, but they remain 
as suggestions or guidelines for the determination and management of TRQs (Skully, 2001). 
They explicitly state that both minimum and current access opportunities should be introduced 
on an MFN basis.  The question is whether there is a legal basis to discriminate in favour of 
developing countries in the administration of TRQs. 
The principal reference here is the Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause) 
introduced in 1979 to allow the granting of more favourable treatment to developing countries 
on a non-reciprocal basis.  Paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause permits preferential tariff 
treatment to products originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized 
System of Preferences.  A footnote to this paragraph describes this scheme as relating to the 
establishment of generalized, non-reciprocal and non discriminatory preferences beneficial to the 
developing countries.  On the face of it, this waiver appears not to apply to preferential in-quota 
TRQ tariffs unless they were introduced within the context of GSP schemes.  However, GSP 
preferences have well-known drawbacks.  They are unilateral, not negotiated.  Tariff concessions 
are invariably subject to a safeguard clause and can be withdrawn at any time.  Eligibility is often 
subject to additional conditions (on labour standards or observance of intellectual property 
protection, for example).  It would be possible to envisage a separate waiver for in-quota TRQ 
tariffs which might be bound in Members’ Schedules, but the complexities of negotiating this on 
top of negotiating the concessions themselves would certainly add to the negotiating cost. 
A further issue is whether in-quota tariff preferences could be confined to particular 
groups of developing countries, as proposed by the Small Island Developing States.  The 
Enabling Clause appears to require that all developing countries benefit and that there should be 
non-discrimination among beneficiaries.  The one clear exception is the possibility of granting 
more generous preferential treatment to least-developed countries, as confirmed in the 1994 
Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries and the 1999 Decision on 
Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries. Preference donors have disputed   16 
this interpretation on the grounds that as they are not obliged to give preferences they can give 
them to some developing countries only.  This issue may be clarified by a panel which has been 
initiated by Thailand where the footnote in the Enabling Clause referring to non-discrimination 
will be examined (WT/DS242). 
In the case of import restrictions or tariff rate quotas, which inherently require some 
administrative allocation mechanism, it can be difficult to determine if the MFN principle is 
being applied.  For this reason, Article XIII of the GATT sets out rules to govern the 
administration of TRQs. The basic principle set out in paragraph 2 is that contracting parties 
“shall aim at a distribution of trade … approaching as closely as possible the shares which the 
various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions…”.  
Countries may operate either a global quota or allocate country-specific shares. Paragraph 2(d) 
sets out the rules countries should follow if TRQs are allocated to particular supplier countries. 
In such cases, either the importing country should seek agreement with respect to the allocation 
of shares in the quota with all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying 
the product concerned, or the importing country should allocate shares to those contracting 
parties having a substantial interest based on the proportions supplied by those contracting 
parties during a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors 
which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product. Clearly, there is much 
scope for argument over what special factors might have operated or may be operating in 
allocating supplier shares based on historical data.  
Preferential access to increased TRQ volumes would be in breach of Article XIII.  
However, paragraph 2(b) of the Enabling Clause provides a waiver for differential and more 
favourable treatment concerning non-tariff measures of this kind governed by the provisions of 
instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT.  If there was agreement to 
provide preferential access to increased TRQ volumes to developing countries in a new 
Agreement on Agriculture, then this would appear to allow it to be covered by the Enabling 
Clause waiver.  Again, the preferential access would seem to be required to be made available on 
a global basis (apart from special treatment for least-developed countries).  Alternatively, if 
importing countries adopted an allocation method based on country-specific shares, as is allowed 
under Article XIII, preferential access might be interpreted as confining the countries eligible to 
receive allocations to developing country suppliers. 
A third mode of preferential treatment under TRQs would be to institute arrangements 
designed to ensure that the quota rents created were transferred to developing countries.  As 
pointed out in de Gorter and Sheldon (2001), WTO rules are only concerned with how quota   17 
administration influences the volume and distribution of trade and are not directly concerned 
with the distribution of rents.  However, they also point out that rents cannot be arbitrarily 
distributed in ways which alter competitive conditions between countries.  Under the Banana 
Framework Agreement (BFA), the EU required some but not all countries to issue export 
certificates for their country-specific TRQs. This regulation was intended to transfer part of the 
quota rent to the suppliers of bananas from these countries. The panel set up to adjudicate on 
complaints against the EU’s banana regime did not object to the use of export certificates per se, 
but ruled that the EU was in violation of GATT Article I which states that “… with respect to 
all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, … any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party … shall be accorded … to the like 
product originating in … the territories of all other contracting parties”. This was because 
requiring export licences from some suppliers but not all was inherently discriminatory 
(WT/DS27/R).  The discrimination in the BFA made distinctions between developing country 
suppliers.  It might be possible to defend an arrangement which discriminated in favour of all 
developing countries as a preferential non-tariff measure under the Enabling Clause.  Again, 
however, this would only be possible if the measure was included in a multilaterally-negotiated 
WTO agreement.   
This discussion of the legal context in which preferential TRQs might be sought 
highlights the limited room for manoeuvre that exists under the Enabling Clause.  While the 
possibility of negotiating a more extensive waiver or interpretation of the Enabling Clause always 
exists, it would add further to the negotiating capital which would have to be expended in order 
to gain worthwhile concessions for developing countries under this heading.  Other issues in the 
benefit-cost calculus are considered in the following section. 
 
4.  Would expanding TRQs be worth it? 
In this section we draw a distinction between systemic criticisms of TRQs as a way of 
managing global trade and objections to TRQs on the grounds that the benefits to developing 
country recipients may be transitory, non-existent or even negative.  For example, limiting a 
TRQ to a specific country’s exports lowers the benefit in terms of trade liberalisation of the 
TRQ compared with a global quota open to any country. But if the specific recipient is enabled 
to increase its exports in the reserved situation relative to a global quota, then from its point of 
view the reserved quota system may be the preferred one.  Our concern in this section is 
whether there are specific reasons to suggest that the economic benefits of TRQ access to 
developing countries may be limited.     18 
The growing literature on TRQ administration points out that the apparent benefits of 
TRQ access can be nullified or reduced in a number of ways (Abbott and Morse, 1999; de 
Gorter and Sheldon, 2000; Skully, 2001) .  These include rent dissipation, business uncertainty, 
and resource misallocation effects.  TRQs have two main potential benefits;  they allow some 
trade to take place in the face of prohibitive over-quota tariffs, generating a welfare surplus for 
the exporter on this trade; and they create rents which the exporter may hope to access as a form 
of trade-linked transfer.  However, which agents actually capture the rents created by TRQs 
depends on institutional factors and market structure.  Developing country exporters do capture 
the rents in some specific TRQs (for example, those allocated to ACP sugar exporters under the 
Lomé Convention, now the Cotonou Agreement) but in many cases these are captured by 
distribution agents or consumers in the importing country.  Exporting countries may try to put 
in place institutions to capture these rents, such as state trading enterprises or producer 
associations with some degree of monopoly power.  These institutions, in turn, may generate 
complex schemes to distribute these rents to domestic agents.  As a result, the actual benefit to 
exporters from this form of tied aid is often much less than initially foreseen (Abbott and Morse, 
1999).   It is also easier to implement such arrangements where quota allocations are country-
specific, and there is no requirement that preferential access to increased TRQ volumes would be 
administered on a country-specific rather than global quota basis. 
The expected increase in market access may also not materialise depending on the nature 
of the TRQ administrative mechanisms used to allocate quotas shared by more than one 
country.  Under the first-come, first-served system, for example, with no specific import rights 
allocated to either the exporter or the importer, an exporter risks the costs of shipping the 
product and finding that the quota has been  filled.  Under these conditions long-term contracts 
and business relationships are hard to establish.  Even where new markets are successfully 
established, they may encourage a wasteful resource misallocation in the exporting country if 
their exploitation depends on the continued protection of MFN tariffs in the importing market.  
The availability of preferential TRQ access might encourage a country to become an exporter 
even where it has no long-term comparative advantage in the production of that commodity.  
Sugar exports from the Philippines are given as an example by Abbott and Morse (1999).   
Finally, there are arguments based on negotiating strategy.  TRQ preferences by 
definition will be temporary as their value will be eroded by successive rounds of MFN tariff 
reductions.  It does not appear sensible to invest huge resources into gaining what at best would 
be a temporary concession.  There is also the danger of fragmenting the developing country 
negotiating effort because, inevitably, seeking to improve market access through increased   19 
TRQs, and particularly through preferential TRQs, would detract from the efforts to gain further 
improvements in MFN access.  Thus, trade flow data suggest that there would be potential 
benefits from increased TRQ access for developing countries, whether or not on a preferential 
basis.  However, economic arguments about the real value of these benefits, legal uncertainty 
about whether preferential access to, or preferential treatment under, increased TRQs could be 
given to developing countries under existing Enabling Clause provisions, and the costs in terms 
of negotiating capital in pursuing increased TRQ access point to greater benefits to developing 
countries in pursuing MFN tariff liberalisation rather than increasing TRQs.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Developing countries are proposing improved market access under TRQs in the current 
round of trade negotiations.  The majority of developing country proposals call for a substantial 
increase in tariff rate quota volumes, as well as greater transparency in and the simplification of 
administrative arrangements.  A number of countries have suggested that special and differential 
treatment could apply to TRQs, and that developing countries, or sub-groups of them, might be 
given either preferential in-quota tariffs or preferential volume access.  There is also the 
possibility of requiring administrative arrangements to ensure that, as far as possible, quota rents 
are transferred back to developing country exporters rather than captured by importing country 
agents. 
The EU is taken as a case study to examine the potential usefulness of increased TRQ 
access for developing countries. Over 60 per cent of the EU’s agricultural imports are currently 
supplied by developing countries.  Potentially, TRQ imports could amount to 14 per cent of 
actual imports though, in practice, just over 10 per cent of imports enter under TRQs.  The 
average fill rate (weighted by value) is 76 per cent.  Sugar, dairy and fruit and vegetable TRQs 
have the highest fill rates, while fill rates for cereals and milling products, live animals and meat 
and other processed foods and drink are below average.  The EU has bound a number of its 
preferential access commitments to developing countries as TRQ commitments. The most 
important cover sugar and beef (but not banana) imports from ACP countries, banana imports 
from Latin American suppliers (though these have been the subject of successive WTO disputes 
and TRQs will be eliminated when a tariff-only regime for banana imports is introduced not later 
than 1 January, 2006), manioc imports from Thailand and Indonesia and meat imports from 
Latin American suppliers. Partly as a result of these specific bilateral commitments, TRQs cover 
a higher value of developing country exports to the EU than for developed countries (in 
percentage terms, however, TRQ access is slightly less important for developing country   20 
exporters).  The evidence from the EU market on the relatively low share of developing country 
exports accounted for by TRQ trade suggests that increasing TRQs could be an important 
means of improving their market access.  The main beneficiaries would be Asian and Latin 
American suppliers not eligible for the even more favourable access terms announced for least-
developed countries under the EU’s Everything But Arms initiative. 
Having established an a priori case for the relevance of increasing TRQ access, the paper 
discussed the legal issues raised by the proposal for preferential TRQs.  Preferential treatment 
for developing countries with respect to tariffs and non-tariff measures is sanctioned by the 1979 
Enabling Clause.  However, a close reading of this Decision raises doubts whether the waiver 
from MFN treatment it contains would automatically cover either preferential in-quota tariffs, 
preferential access to increased quota volume or discriminatory licensing arrangements.  
Preferential in-quota tariffs could be justified as part of GSP preference schemes, but 
would suffer from the well-known drawbacks of these preferences.  They are unilateral, they are 
not bound and thus are subject to change, and they often come associated with eligibility 
conditions. 
There are also strong economic arguments as to why developing countries should be 
wary of putting their efforts behind improving TRQ access rather than maximising the size of 
MFN tariff reductions.  The dangers of distortionary trade and rent-seeking which economists 
worry about when evaluating the systemic impact of TRQs on global trade are not necessarily 
those of most concern to potential beneficiaries of the system.  Developing countries want better 
market access for their agricultural exports, and if this could be brought about easily through 
expanded TRQs they might not be too concerned about the systemic impacts.  What is 
important is whether there are self-interested arguments advising developing countries against 
this choice.  In our view, three arguments are convincing.  First, TRQ preferences by definition 
will be temporary as their value will be eroded by successive rounds of MFN tariff reductions.  It 
does not appear sensible to invest huge resources into gaining what at best would be a temporary 
concession.  Second, related to this point, there is a danger that building up markets whose value 
depends in part on continued protection would encourage resources in developing countries into 
sectors which are not sustainable in the longer-run.  Third, there would be a clear danger of 
fragmenting the developing country negotiating effort because, inevitably, gains on TRQ access 
would be traded off against further improvements in MFN access.  Our conclusion is that 
developing countries should focus primarily on seeking improved market access through MFN 
tariff reductions in the ongoing Special Session on Agriculture negotiations.   
   21 
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